The wisdom of large and small crowds: Evidence from repeated natural experiments in sports betting by Brown, Alasdair & Yang, Fuyu
The Wisdom of Large and Small Crowds: Evidence from
Repeated Natural Experiments in Sports Betting∗
Alasdair Brown†
University of East Anglia
Fuyu Yang‡
University of East Anglia
June 11, 2018
∗We would like to thank the Editors, two anonymous referees, and an audience at DIW Berlin for very
helpful comments. Alasdair Brown acknowledges financial support from the British Academy and the Lever-
hulme Trust (Ref: SG140097). The research presented in this paper was carried out on the High Performance
Computing Cluster supported by the Research and Specialist Computing Support service at the University
of East Anglia. The usual disclaimer applies.
†Corresponding Author. School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.. Email:
alasdair.brown@uea.ac.uk
‡School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.. Email: fuyu.yang@uea.ac.uk
1
The Wisdom of Large and Small Crowds
Abstract
Prediction markets have proved excellent tools for forecasting, outperforming ex-
perts and polls in many settings. But do larger markets, with wider participation,
perform better than smaller markets? In this paper we analyse a series of repeated nat-
ural experiments in sports betting. The Queen’s Club Tennis Championships are held
every year, but every other year the Championships clash with a major soccer tour-
nament. We find that tennis betting prices become significantly less informative when
participation rates are adversely affected by the clashing soccer tournament. This sug-
gests that measures which increase prediction market participation may lead to greater
forecast accuracy.
JEL Classification: G02, G12, G14
Keywords: prediction markets, forecasting, sports betting, natural experiment
1 Introduction
Prediction markets – where bets are traded on the outcome of future events – have proved
excellent tools for forecasting. Forecasts produced by these markets have historically proved
more accurate than polls in predicting political races (Vaughan Williams and Reade, 2016),
and have proved more accurate than tipsters (and indeed bookmakers) in predicting sporting
outcomes (Spann and Skiera, 2009, Franck et al., 2010). Due to this success, many firms now
employ internal prediction markets to improve their decision-making (Cowgill and Zitzewitz,
2015).
But how important is the size of these markets? Do larger markets, with wider par-
ticipation, perform better than smaller markets? This is an important question, because a
prediction market can be designed to attract a large group of traders, or can be designed
such that a few key informed individuals are encouraged to take part. In a corporate context,
firms could decide to limit prediction market participation to insiders, as is often the case,
or open up the market to outside consumers and pundits.
On the one hand, bigger is not necessarily better. The actions of noise traders (De Long
et al., 1990) – who trade for non-informational reasons and divert asset prices from efficient
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values – may mean that a small market, shorn of such individuals, actually performs better.
On other other hand, without noise traders and wide participation, the returns to informed
trading will be lower, and therefore information will not be collected and incorporated into
prices (Black, 1986, and Bessembinder et al., 2015). It is also possible, of course, that
information is not simply in the hands of a small number of informed traders – as assumed in
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) – but is instead dispersed across a large number of individuals
(Galton, 1907, Surowiecki, 2005). Therefore, only by combining the views of a large crowd
can prices be efficient and forecasts accurate.
In this paper we analyse a series of repeated natural experiments in sports betting. The
Queen’s Club Tennis Championships are held every year in London, but every other year
the Championships clash with a major soccer tournament. This soccer tournament – either
the World Cup or the European Championships – attracts a substantial number of bettors,
and therefore makes for a smaller crowd for tennis betting. Using a sample of more than
13 million Betfair betting exchange prices from 2008 to 2013, we compare the accuracy of
tennis betting prices in odd years when there was no soccer tournament, with the accuracy
of prices in even years when there was a soccer tournament. We find that tennis betting
prices become significantly less accurate – both pre-match and inplay – when participation
rates are adversely affected by the clashing soccer tournament.
Our research setting is ideal to compare the relative forecasting success of large and small
prediction markets. One prominent obstacle in estimating a causal relationship between
market size and price efficiency (forecast accuracy) is the obvious endogeneity of these two
variables. Along the lines of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), a small inefficient market may
become large precisely because traders are attracted by the inefficiency. (Until the inefficiency
disappears, of course, and these traders then leave). It is therefore important that we have
an exogenous shock to market size that has no direct impact on price efficiency. It is also
important that our natural experiment is repeated. There is no reason why tennis matches
in an odd or even year should be fundamentally more or less difficult to forecast. The only
factor that should affect the efficiency of these prices is the effect that the clashing soccer
tournament has on participation. We are therefore not concerned about confounding the
effect of the clashing soccer tournament with any steady drifts over time in betting market
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price accuracy. This can be an issue with a simple before/after comparison.
In fact, the exogenous scheduling of soccer matches has been used as an instrument in
two quite different settings. Metcalfe et al. (2011) analysed the effect of the same summer
soccer tournaments on U.K. student performance, as these tournaments clash with important
examinations and revision-time in even years. In addition, Webbink et al. (2016) analysed
the effect of media attention on the solving of crime, exploiting the fact that in certain weeks
a Dutch crime programme clashes with the screening of live European soccer and therefore
has lower viewing figures.1
There has been quite mixed evidence on the effect of market participation on price ef-
ficiency in sports betting markets, when other empirical approaches have been used. For
example, Lahvička (2014) and Abinzano et al. (2016) find that the favourite-longshot bias
is more pronounced in high-profile tournaments, when we might expect betting market par-
ticipation to be higher.2 However, these high-profile tournaments differ from lower-profile
events not simply in terms of betting interest but also, one might expect, in terms of the
difficulty of the underlying forecasting problem. The difficulty of forecasting Queen’s Club
matches, on the other hand, should not vary across even and odd years: only the exogenous
level of betting market participation is likely to vary (due to the clashing soccer tournament).
Adding to the mixed results, Flepp et al. (2014) find that increased liquidity is associated
with weaker price efficiency for weekend soccer matches (when betting market participation
should be higher), but not weekday soccer matches. However, in their paper there is quasi-
experimental variation in the minimum cost of trading (liquidity), facilitated by Betfair tick
size boundaries, but there is no quasi-experimental variation in actual betting market par-
ticipation. The repeated natural experiments we study in our paper provide precisely that
type of quasi-experimental variation in betting market participation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the scheduling
of the tennis and soccer tournaments, and describe our data and variables. In Section 3 we
1Izquierdo Sanchez et al. (2016) also use the exogenous scheduling of major soccer tournaments to assess
the degree of substitution between leisure activities; they find substantial drops in cinema attendance during
these events.
2In addition to these two papers which consider the efficiency of tennis betting markets by the degree of
the favourite-longshot bias, others – including Easton and Uylangco (2010) and McHale and Morton (2011)
– consider whether calibrated models of tennis match outcomes can produce positive betting returns.
3
The Wisdom of Large and Small Crowds
present our analysis. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Data
The Queen’s Club Tennis Championships are one of the oldest male tennis tournaments, dat-
ing from 1890. The week-long tournament runs from Monday to Sunday in early June every
year, and involves 6 main knockout rounds, preceded by qualifiers. All matches are played in
a best of three sets format. The tournament is usually used as grass-court preparation for the
Wimbledon Tennis Championships, which follow later in June, and is screened on the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the U.K.. The BBC screen one or two matches on their
main channels, BBC1 and BBC2, and in recent years have screened additional matches online
at www.bbc.co.uk. (Incidentally, the availability of third and fourth tier matches online in
recent years is one reason why it is important that our natural experiment is repeated and
not a simple before and after comparison; the effect of the latter could be confounded with
drifts in viewing availability over time).
In even-numbered years, the Queen’s Club Championships clashes with one of two major
soccer tournaments: the World Cup or the European Championships. Between 2008 and
2013 (the period of our data), there were European Championships in 2008 and 2012 and a
World Cup in 2010. In 2008 and 2012, there were soccer matches on every day of the tennis
championships. For example, Queen’s (as it is often referred to) took place from the 9th-15th
June in 2008, and the European Championships took place from the 7th to the 29th June.
The situation was slightly different in 2010, as the World Cup did not begin until the 11th
June, while Queen’s started on the 7th June. Nevertheless, there was a substantial build-up
to the soccer tournament – not least involving the last pre-tournament friendly matches –
which would have distracted tennis bettors relative to odd years with no soccer tournament.
One issue surrounding non-Grand Slam tournaments, such as Queen’s, is the participa-
tion of the top players. The level of betting interest in these tournaments is often dependent
on whether the high-ranked players – not least the ‘big-four’ of Roger Federer, Rafael Nadal,
Novak Djokovic and Andy Murray – take part. Although the participation of these players is
of course not dependent on whether there is a concurrent soccer tournament, their participa-
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tion decisions may introduce noise into our natural experiment. Over the period 2008-2013,
Roger Federer did not take part at all, Andy Murray competed every year, Rafael Nadal
entered in 2008, 2010 and 2011, and Novak Djokovic entered in 2008 and 2010.
To ascertain the significance of this variation in participation, we collected data from
tennisdata.co.uk on every Queen’s Club match between 2008 and 2013. This data include
the identity and ranking of each player at the time of each match. We begin by checking
whether the aforementioned ‘big-four’ participated in more matches in even or odd years. In
Panel A of Table 1, we regress an indicator variable equalling 1 if the player was a member
of the big-four (and 0 otherwise) on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the match was played
in an even year (and 0 if the match was played in an odd year). There are two observations
for each match, one for each player. We find that the participation rates of the big-four did
not vary significantly across even and odd years. While the big-four may have entered the
tournament slightly more frequently in even years, due to early exits they did not participate
in significantly more matches.
In Panel B, we repeat the regression but add the year number – from 1 (2008) to 6 (2013)
– to our regressions. This controls for any drift in big-four participation over the years. We
find that big-four participation declined slightly over the 6 years, and that once we control
for this, big-four participation was actually lower in even years (albeit insignificantly so). In
the remainder of Table 1 we present similar analysis where we replace the big-four indicator
with an indicator equalling 1 if the player was ranked in the top ten at the time, or the
ranking of the player. In all cases – whether we control for drifts over time or not – we
find no significant differences in the probability of top-ten involvement or the ranking of the
players in even or odds years. In short, we find little evidence to suggest that noise in the
participation of players across even and odds years affects the internal validity of the natural
experiment.
We centre our main analysis on the Betfair betting exchange. Founded in 2000, Betfair
is the largest betting exchange in the world, and operates markets across sports, politics
and economics. The main function of the exchange is, of course, betting, but these markets
operate in very similar ways to predictions markets set up purely for the purpose of fore-
casting. In fact, recognising the desire of others to use their betting prices as forecasting
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tools, Betfair now display market implied probabilities of various events under the banner
‘Betfair Predicts’.3 The exchange operates as a standard limit order book as used in many
financial markets (Parlour and Seppi, 2008). This means that traders can post limit orders,
which act as quotes for others, or place market orders, which execute against prices quoted
by others. Traders can make quotes, but as in bookmaker markets these quotes will not
necessarily be matched by another trader. Bettors can take long positions that an outcome
(e.g. Andy Murray to win a given match) will occur, with ‘back’ bets, or short positions
that an outcome will not occur, with ‘lay’ bets. Prices are quoted in the form of odds plus
the stake. For example, Betfair odds of 5 are equivalent to 4-1 in traditional betting terms,
which means that 4 GBP will be returned in addition to the stake for every 1 GBP wagered,
if the outcome occurs.
We obtained our main data from Fracsoft, a third-party company which until 2014 was
licensed to distribute Betfair data. The Fracsoft data provide second-by-second sampling of
the Betfair limit order book. This gives the researcher the best three back and lay quotes,
with associated volumes, every second, and also the last transaction price and total volume
transacted, again measured each second. We obtained data for every year of the Queen’s Club
Championships from 2008 to 2013. This data include pre-match betting from the morning of
each match until it begins, and inplay betting for the whole duration of each match. In total,
we have more than 13 million observations (taken each second) of Betfair prices from 271
matches over the 6 years. 9.6 million of these observations are pre-match, with 3.6 million
inplay.
In our upcoming analysis we are interested in three main measures, which we summarise
in Table 2. Each of these measures is summarised separately for pre-match betting (Panel
A) and inplay betting (Panel B). The first two measures are related to the frequency and
size of trade. We define a trade indicator, equalling 1 if there was a trade for that bet in that
second and 0 otherwise. This allows us to measure whether trades became less frequent when
there was a clashing soccer tournament. Trade size, the second of our measures, is calculated
in GBP. Another way of looking at these first two measures is that the trade indicator is a
proxy for the extensive margin of betting (i.e. the number of people betting) and trade size
3https://www.betfairpredicts.com/.
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is a proxy for the intensive margin of betting (i.e. the amount that active participants bet).
Our third measure is the forecast error, which is defined as the absolute difference between
the price of the bet (in implied win probability terms using the midpoint of the back-lay
spread) and the realized value of the bet, which is 1 if the outcome subsequently occurred
and 0 if not. For example, if in one second we observe Betfair midpoint odds of 5 for a player
that subsequently goes on to lose, this would translate to a forecast error of 0.2. This is
because the implied win probability for Betfair odds of 5 is 1/5 = 0.2 and the realized value
was 0. If the same player had won, the forecast error would have been 0.8. We can see that
forecast errors are on average lower during inplay betting. This is to be expected, as the
closer we get to the end of each match the closer we get to the realization of the terminal
value of the bet.
Before we proceed to our main analysis it is worth outlining, for those not familiar with
the game, the ways in which information can be collected for betting on tennis matches.
While the types of information that are relevant in financial markets or political prediction
markets may be more obvious – e.g. balance sheet data or local polling data respectively –
this may not be the case for tennis betting. Prior to matches, a bettor could study the recent
form of a player and, in particular, his recent match-ups against his current opponent on the
surface they are about to play on (e.g. grass, hard-court, clay). When it comes to inplay
betting, one common practice is to go the venues and place bets before those watching at
home. These so-called ‘courtsiders’ benefit from knowledge of the outcome of the most recent
point, giving them a series of fleeting advantages over those not at the venue. Another way
to gain an edge in inplay betting is to devise a model of the outcome of the tennis match
based on the current score. The simplest approach would be to assign a fixed probability
that player A wins a point on serve (and a different probability on return), and treat each
point independently. More complicated models would allow for momentum, fatigue, and the
specifics of historical match-ups between the two players. These models are often combined
with a court-side position to create the greatest advantage.4 In short, there are a number of
choices that bettors must make regarding the information they collect, and the effort they put
into forecasting the outcome of the tennis match. It is likely that these choices are affected
4‘Inside the Shadowy World of High-Speed Tennis Betting’, Carl Bialik, 538, May 29th 2014.
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by the size of these markets and the returns on offer for informed trading, which is likely to
be determined, in part, by whether or not there is a concurrent soccer tournament.
In this paper we compare the accuracy of betting prices in even years, when there was a
soccer tournament, to the accuracy of prices in odd years, when there was not. But why not
also exploit the within-year variation? We might expect that if a soccer match is concurrently
being played it would have an even greater impact on the efficiency of tennis prices than if a
soccer match was simply scheduled for later in the same day. The problem with exploiting
within-year variation is that the tennis scheduler has control over the scheduling of matches
within each day. Therefore, he or she may choose to schedule a high-profile match, such as
one involving the British player Andy Murray, at a different time from an England soccer
match, for example. After all, it would make sense for sponsorship reasons for the Queen’s
organisers to keep their highest profile matches away from competing entertainment events.
But, if this is the case, we could not reasonably conclude that prices were more efficient
for the Murray match – relative to a low-profile match on the same day – simply because
the England match did not take place at the same time as the Murray match. The Murray
match would likely have garnered the attention of a significant number of informed bettors
irrespective of the timing of the England match.
Importantly, while the scheduler has discretion within each day – and this leads to the
within-year selection effect we just described – there is no such discretion regarding the week
in which the tournament is played. Queen’s Club Championships is set for the same week
every year in the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) Calendar, and therefore the
clash with soccer tournaments every other year is unavoidable. Therefore, we can reasonably
argue that any resultant drop in betting price efficiency in even years is caused by the drop
in participation caused by the concurrent soccer tournament.
3 Analysis
We begin our analysis by firstly checking whether the clashing soccer tournament had an
impact on the level of participation in tennis betting. This is central to our claim that
prediction market crowds were exogenously smaller in years with a soccer tournament. In
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Panel A of Table 3, we regress an indicator variable – equalling 1 if there was a trade in
that second and 0 otherwise – on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the second sampled
was in an even year (with a soccer tournament) and 0 if it was in an odd year (without a
soccer tournament). For this and all subsequent regressions we cluster standard errors at
the selection level. For example, Andy Murray in the Final in 2011 would be one cluster.
We run this regression separately for pre-match and inplay betting. We find that the soccer
tournament did indeed have a substantial impact on the frequency of trade: pre-match trade
was 18.33% less frequent in even years and inplay trade was 15.15% less frequent in even
years. In regressions 3 and 4 in Panel A we then regress the size of trades, measured in GBP,
on the even year indicator. Based on our results, there does not seem to be any significant
difference in the size of trades across even and odd years, either pre-match or inplay. At this
stage, our results suggests that the extensive margin of tennis betting (i.e. the number of
participants) declined, but not the intensive margin (i.e. the amount of betting by active
participants). Of course, this translates to a decline in overall trading volume.
In Panel B of Table 3 we repeat the analysis in Panel A, but this time add the year
number – from 1 (2008) to 6 (2013) – to our regressions. This controls for any drift in the
frequency and size of trades over time. In regressions 1-4 of Panel B, we find no evidence of
drift, and indeed find qualitatively similar results to those in Panel A. After controlling for
any time-trend, the frequency of pre-match trading declined by 18.78% and the frequency
of inplay trading declined by 14.73%. There was no significant impact on the size of trades,
either pre-match or inplay. Overall, our results in Table 2 suggest that the clashing soccer
tournament did indeed cause there to be a smaller crowd for tennis betting.5
We next turn to the main part of our analysis: the effect of the clashing soccer tournament
on the accuracy of prices. Our first dependent variable is the forecast error, defined as the
absolute difference between the price of the bet (in implied win probability terms) and the
realized value of the bet, which is 1 if the outcome subsequently occurred and 0 if not. We
measure these forecast errors every second, pre-match and inplay. As we can see from Table
2, forecast errors are on average higher pre-match; at the end of each match the forecast
5These results are also robust to the addition of fixed effects for day of the week (a proxy for tournament
round) and fixed effects for each player.
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error will of course be zero. Replicating the structure of Table 3, in Panel A of Table 4 we
regress the forecast error on the indicator variable equalling 1 if the price was in an even
year (when there was a soccer tournament). We find that forecast errors were significantly
higher in even years. In pre-match trading forecast errors were 12.75% higher in even years,
and in inplay trading forecast errors were 15.84% higher in even years. In Panel B of Table
4 we again add the year, numbered 1 to 6, as an additional control variable to control for
any time-drift in forecast errors. There is only slight evidence of an upward drift in forecast
errors in inplay trading, and once we control for this, we find qualitatively similar results
to Panel A. Pre-match forecast errors were 15.9% higher in even years, and inplay forecast
errors were a startling 23.25% higher in even years. Based on our first measure of forecast
accuracy, we find clear evidence that a smaller crowd leads to less efficient prices and less
accurate forecasts.
To summarize our forecast error results, in Figure 1 we plot the average forecast error for
each year in our sample. This plot runs from 2008 to 2013, and pre-match and inplay forecast
errors are displayed separately. With the exception perhaps of 2008, we find a zigzagged
pattern that might be expected with repeated natural experiments. Forecast errors go up in
years when the soccer tournament is on and the tennis crowd is exogenously smaller, and go
back down when there is no soccer tournament and the crowd recovers in size.
There are of course alternative ways to measure the accuracy of betting market prices.
One popular method is to measure the degree of the favourite longshot bias. This bias –
dating at least as far back as Griffith (1949) – describes the tendency of favourites to win
more often than betting prices imply, though in some cases, notably Busche and Hall (1988),
the bias is in the opposite direction with longshots winning more often than prices imply.
The degree of the bias is measured with the following equation:
yi = β0 + β1xit + εit (1)
yi is an indicator variable, equalling 1 if player i won the match, xit is the implied win
probability of player i winning as measured from the odds at time t, and εit is an error term.
In an ‘efficient’ market, β1 will have an estimated value close to or equal to 1. This equation
is often labelled the Mincer-Zarnowitz regression (Mincer and Zarnowitz, 1969), and has been
10
The Wisdom of Large and Small Crowds
used to assess betting price efficiency by Vaughan Williams and Reade (2016) and Brown
and Yang (2016), among others.
Before we present our results, it is worth noting that there is some debate about the
reasons for the favourite-longshot bias. One interpretation is that deviations of β1 from 1
reflect mispricing. However, others have linked the bias to risk-loving behaviour, as bettors
over-bet longshots, thereby driving down their returns, and under-bet favourites, thereby
driving up their returns (Weitzman, 1965). Alternatively, others argue that the bias arises
due to a failure to accurately calibrate the probability of low-likelihood events (e.g. Snowberg
and Wolfers, 2010), or even due to adverse selection from informed bettors (e.g. Shin, 1993).
In short, differences in the deviation of β1 from 1 in odd and even years may be due to
mispricing (which is our focus), or may be due to a range of other factors (see Ottaviani and
Sørensen, 2008, for a survey of explanations for the bias).
We estimate Equation (1) and present our results in Table 5. Separate regressions are run
for odd and even years, and pre-match and inplay trading. While examining our β1 estimates,
we may also be interested in the R2; the proportion of variation in the win indicator that can
be explained by prices (implied win probabilities). The higher the R2, the more informative
the prices. The R2 was used to measure betting price efficiency by Franck et al. (2010) and
Brown and Yang (2016). For our β1 estimates, we actually find larger deviations from 1 in
odd years, suggesting that prices were less efficient when the crowd was exogenously larger.
This applies to both pre-match and inplay trading. The R2, on the other hand, was higher
in odds years – both pre-match and inplay – suggesting that there were more informative
prices when the crowd was exogenously larger. In short, the results in Table 4 present quite
a mixed picture.
Perhaps the best way to evaluate the informativeness of prices is to use them to forecast
the winners and losers of tennis matches, and compare this forecast accuracy across odd and
even years. One approach along these lines is to construct Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves. This is a method originally used to determine the accuracy of radar systems,
but subsequently used predominantly in assessing the accuracy of medical diagnostic tests.
We begin by estimating logit regressions of a similar form to Equation (1). A win indicator
– equalling 1 if the player won the match and 0 otherwise – is regressed on the implied win
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probability as inferred from the betting prices. The results of these regressions are displayed
in Table 6. We use these estimates to predict winners and losers, and then evaluate these
predictions against actual outcomes. When evaluating the accuracy of binary forecasts, we
are concerned with the ‘Sensitivity’ of the model – which in our case is the proportion of
match winners correctly identified by the model (and, by extension, the betting prices) – and
also the ‘Specificity’ of the model, which is the proportion of match losers correctly identified
by the model. Greater Sensitivity comes at the cost of lower Specificity as, to take an extreme
example, if you said that every player was going to win you would not identify a single loser.
In Figure 2 we plot ROC curves for pre-match and inplay data, in the left and right panel
respectively. The method for plotting these curves is described in DeLong et al., (1988).
Odd years (without a soccer tournament) and even years (with a soccer tournament) are
plotted separately. The curves plot Sensitivity against 1-Specificity. The curve is plotted by
selecting a range of cut-offs – e.g. if the model states the player has a win probability>0.55,
then predict a win – and evaluating Sensitivity and Specificity for each cut-off. The area
under the curve can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly selected (actual) winner
of a match had a higher win probability (according to the model, and therefore the prices)
than a randomly selected loser. A model, and the inputs into the model, therefore only has
any forecasting accuracy if the area under the ROC curve is greater than 0.5.
We can see from Figure 2 that forecast accuracy was significantly higher in odd years,
when market participation was exogenously higher, than in even years. This applies to
both pre-match and inplay trading. For pre-match trading, the area under the ROC curve
was 0.8033 in even years and 0.8939 in odd years. For inplay trading, the area under the
ROC curve was 0.8257 in even years and 0.9093 in odd years. In short, prices were more
informative – and helped to produce models that forecasted more accurately – when the
prediction market crowd was exogenously larger. Looking at all of our results from Tables
4-6 and Figures 1-2, the overall impression is that larger crowds do indeed make for more
accurate prices and forecasts.
Why is that larger prediction market crowds produce more accurate forecasts? As alluded
to in the Introduction, there are at least two potential explanations. Large crowds may create
higher returns and incentives for informed trading, and therefore lead to more information
12
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being collected, traded upon, and incorporated into prices. In the tennis betting context,
this would mean that large crowds incentivize bettors to study the form and match-ups of
players, develop new models of inplay bet pricing, and perhaps get a courtside seat in order to
gain a fleeting informational advantage over bettors watching at home. The second potential
explanation is that information is perhaps dispersed amongst the crowd. Therefore, only by
gathering a large crowd can we – by something akin to the law of large numbers – get an
unbiased and accurate estimate of a player’s win probability.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to convincingly distinguish between these two
explanations. We would need to observe the information possessed by each trader, and then
ascertain whether the new traders that arrived in the tennis betting market in odd years were
informed, or whether they simply increased the liquidity of the market and thereby increased
the returns and incentives for informed trading. Our data do not allow us to observe the
identity of each bettor, let alone the information they possess and acquire. What we can say
is that there is appears to a positive causal relationship between market participation and
the accuracy of prediction market prices.
4 Conclusion
Prediction markets – where participants bet on the outcome of future events – have increased
in popularity and scope in recent years. The use of such markets is no longer restricted to
sports and politics, as firms across a range of sectors now use these markets in an attempt
to improve their internal decision-making.
The designer of a prediction market must decide whether to structure the accessibility
and the incentives of the market so that as many individuals participate as possible, or
limit participation to a few chosen, perhaps more informed, individuals. On the one hand,
inviting large numbers of traders may lead to a degree of uninformed ‘noise-trading’, which
may distort prices. On the other hand, without the depth and profits created by a large
trading crowd, there is less incentive for others to collect and trade upon new information.
And, as the popular conception of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ implies, information may actually
be dispersed quite widely across the population. Getting more traders in may increase the
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accuracy of prediction market prices and forecasts.
In this paper we analyse a series of repeated natural experiments in sports betting to
examine the causal effect of market/crowd size on prediction market accuracy. The Queen’s
Club Tennis Championships are held every year, but every other year the Championships
clash with a major soccer tournament. The scheduling of the soccer tournament leads to an
exogenously smaller tennis betting crowd. Using more than 13 million Betfair betting prices
between 2008 and 2013, we compare the accuracy (or efficiency) of prices in odd years when
crowds were relatively large, with the accuracy of prices in even years when crowds were
relatively small (due to the soccer tournament). By the majority of our measures, we find
that tennis betting prices were significantly more accurate in years with a larger crowd. This
applies to both pre-match and inplay trading. This suggests that the designers of prediction
markets may wish to open these markets up to a wider crowd in order to improve forecast
accuracy.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Forecast Errors. Plots of average forecast errors – defined as the absolute
difference between the realized value of the bet (0/1) and the price (implied win probability)
of the bet – between 2008 and 2013. In even years there was a clashing soccer tournament.
Separate lines are plotted for pre-match and inplay betting.
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Figure 2: ROC Curves. Plots of Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for odd
years (no soccer tournament) and even years (clashing soccer tournament). Predictions are
derived from the logit regression estimates in Table 6, and evaluated against actual win
outcomes. Sensitivity, the proportion of match winners correctly identified by the model
(and, by extension, the betting prices), is plotted against (1-Specificity), where Specificity
is the proportion of losers correctly identified by the model. A larger area under the ROC
curve implies superior forecasting of outcomes. Separate plots are produced for pre-match
and inplay betting prices/forecasts.
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Table 1: Internal Validity
Panel A: Baseline
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Big Four Top Ten Ranking
Even Year 0.164 -0.0925 3.830
(0.498) (0.423) (6.220)
Constant -2.853*** -2.039*** 82.98***
(0.158) (0.0959) (2.186)
Observations 660 660 659
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.000829 0.000302 0.000
Panel B: With Time Drift
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Big Four Top Ten Ranking
Even Year -0.0894 -0.233 4.867
(0.460) (0.353) (5.972)
Year -0.255* -0.140 1.043
(0.140) (0.133) (1.368)
Constant -1.910*** -1.499*** 78.82***
(0.632) (0.512) (6.513)
Observations 660 660 659
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0211 0.00759 0.001
Robust standard errors – clustered at the year level – in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions to establish the internal validity of the experiment. The three dependent variables
are 1) an indicator variable equalling 1 if the player was a member of the ‘big four’, 2) an
indicator variable equalling 1 if the player was in the top ten at the time of the tournament,
and 3) the ranking of the player at the time of the tournament. These variables are regressed
on an indicator variable equalling 1 if the match took place year in an even year (clashing
soccer tournament) in Panel A. In Panel B we add the year – numbered 1-6 for 2008-2013 –
to capture any drifts over time. Regressions (1) and (2) are logit regressions, while regression
(3) is estimated using OLS. There are two observations for each match, one for each player.
20
The Wisdom of Large and Small Crowds
Table 2: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N mean sd min max
Pre-Match
Trade 9,655,142 .01 .103 0 1
Trade Size 102,614 417 3,963 .007 739,165
Forecast Error 9,642,124 .351 .196 .012 .978
Inplay
Trade 3,629,520 .162 .368 0 1
Trade Size 588,636 580 2,456 .007 276,455
Forecast Error 3,157,058 .322 .214 .001 .998
Summary statistics on all key measures used in the paper. Precise definitions of each of these
measures can be found in Section 2.
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Table 3: Trades
Panel A: Baseline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Trade Trade Trade Size Trade Size
Even Year -0.00220** -0.0267* -30.04 10.63
(0.00107) (0.0136) (69.88) (52.52)
Constant 0.0120*** 0.176*** 430.3*** 575.3***
(0.000817) (0.0103) (49.38) (37.68)
Period Pre-Match Inplay Pre-Match Inplay
Observations 9,655,142 3,629,520 102,614 588,636
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Panel B: With Time Drift
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Trade Trade Trade Size Trade Size
Even Year -0.00246** -0.0249* -20.82 -4.378
(0.00103) (0.0141) (72.67) (54.29)
Year -0.000276 0.00161 8.642 -15.95
(0.000350) (0.00397) (21.35) (14.30)
Constant 0.0131*** 0.169*** 397.3*** 640.4***
(0.00142) (0.0177) (91.18) (68.87)
Period Pre-Match Inplay Pre-Match Inplay
Observations 9,655,142 3,629,520 102,614 588,636
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors – clustered at the selection level – in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions to establish whether the frequency of trades (captured by a trade indicator),
and the size of trades (measured in GBP), varied across odd years (no soccer tournament)
and even years (clashing soccer tournament). Separate regressions are run for pre-match and
inplay betting. In Panel B we add the year – numbered 1-6 for 2008-2013 – to capture any
drifts over time.
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Table 4: Forecast Errors
Panel A: Baseline
(1) (2)
Variables Forecast Error Forecast Error







Panel B: With Time Drift
(1) (2)
Variables Forecast Error Forecast Error









Robust standard errors – clustered at the selection level – in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions to establish whether forecast errors – defined as the absolute difference between
the realized value of the bet (0/1) and the price (implied win probability) of the bet –
varied across odd years (no soccer tournament) and even years (clashing soccer tournament).
Separate regressions are run for pre-match and inplay betting. In Panel B we add the year
– numbered 1-6 for 2008-2013 – to capture any drifts over time.
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Table 5: Favourite-Longshot Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Win Win Win Win
Implied Win Probability 1.358*** 1.079*** 1.247*** 1.038***
(0.0693) (0.0918) (0.0396) (0.0635)
Constant -0.172*** -0.0334 -0.123*** -0.0198
(0.0423) (0.0544) (0.0329) (0.0445)
Period Pre-Match Pre-Match Inplay Inplay
Year Odd Even Odd Even
Observations 4,921,850 4,720,274 1,579,722 1,577,336
R-squared 0.459 0.274 0.499 0.317
Robust standard errors – clustered at the selection level – in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Regressions to establish whether the degree of the favourite-longshot bias – measured by the
deviation of the Implied Win Probability coefficient from 1 – varied across odd years (no
soccer tournament) and even years (clashing soccer tournament). Separate regressions are
run for odd and even years, and pre-match and inplay betting.
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Table 6: Logit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Win Win Win Win
Implied Win Probability 8.774*** 5.506*** 8.348*** 5.434***
(1.150) (0.755) (0.725) (0.580)
Constant -4.331*** -2.720*** -4.170*** -2.728***
(0.594) (0.407) (0.409) (0.341)
Period Pre-Match Pre-Match Inplay Inplay
Year Odd Even Odd Even
Observations 4,921,850 4,720,274 1,579,722 1,577,336
Pseudo R-squared 0.409 0.221 0.449 0.259
Robust standard errors – clustered at the selection level – in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Logit regressions for predicting the winners and losers of Queen’s Club Tennis Championships
matches. These predictions are then evaluated with ROC curves (see Figure 2). Separate
regressions are run for odd and even years, and pre-match and inplay betting.
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